The school's modeling group made predictions about the spill's progress that were used to direct a research vessel on a cruise through the Gulf. That vessel encountered a large plume of oil that, based on the prevailing currents, is moving towards the Dry Tortugas. Should it get that far, the oil will almost certainly spread through the Keys and up the east coast of Florida, carried that way by the Florida current.

“This has been a nightmare well which has everyone all over the place,” wrote BP engineer Brian Morel to a colleague. Morel wanted the company to use a “liner,” or sheath around the well that would keep gas from surging up the pipes and possibly exploding.

One such surge caused the Deepwater Horizon to temporarily shut down in early April, but BP opted against installing the liner, which would have cost an extra $7 million to $10 million.

In addition to BP’s decision not to use a liner, the committee’s letter describes four other examples of risky negligence.

Halliburton, the company responsible for cement in the well shaft, recommended using 21 “centralizers” to position the metal tube that ran down the center of the well. An off-center tube would cause cement to harden at different rates, producing gaps and channels that could weaken its structure and increase chances of failure. BP used just six centralizers.

A mid-April review of the well said “it is unlikely to be a successful cement job,” but BP declined to run a “cement bond log,” a day-long evaluation of the cement’s integrity. A crew that arrived expecting to perform the evaluation was sent home.

BP also failed to circulate muds that filled the well as it was drilled. That allowed mud that stayed on the bottom to absorb gas and debris, further weakening cement at the well’s base. BP then decided not to use a “lockdown sleeve,” which would have secured the top of the well, where it emerged from the seafloor.